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Publicly Traded Justice 
Samuel Ludington  
Abstract 
Private prisons, like hotels, are most profitable when they are at 
maximum occupancy and their guests stay for longer periods of 
time. Because the business-model for private prisons is predicated 
on incarceration rates dictated by public policy, one would 
presume that private prison corporations expend great resources 
to advocating for stricter criminal laws and sentencing. This note 
explores the role of political lobbying and campaign contributions 
of private prison corporations to see if a correlative relationship 
exists between their advocacy and stricter crime laws. Part I of 
the note provides a history of private prisons in America and 
explores the laws which lead to the explosive growth in prison 
populations. Part II will provide an overview of the three largest 
providers of private prisons and analyzes their political 
contributions. Part III discusses other business development 
strategies employed by private prison operators, outside of 
traditional political lobbying schema. Part IV discusses the 
present threat to private prison organizations and concludes that 
public outrage with the capitalization of incarceration, poses an 
existential threat to private prisons. While private prisons have 
expended significant resources in political lobbying, the greatest 
dividends were attributable to their involvement in the American 
Legislative Exchange Council, which allowed private prisons to 
draft legislation that produced demand for their services. 
Nevertheless, these legislative victories are unlikely to withstand 
the threat posed by widespread public frustration, which has 
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PART I: OVERVIEW 
A. Supply and demand economic theory  
A fundamental theory in economics is, holding all else equal in a 
competitive market, the unit price of a good is a function of the quantity 
supplied and the quantity demanded for set good. The greater the demand 
for a good in limited supply, the higher the unit price. Conversely, surplus 
supply of an item in limited demand results in a lower unit cost. This 
theory of supply and demand has served as the foundation for economic 
theory since its postulation, and economist have used it to explain 
fluctuations in the market price for goods ranging from grocery items to 
global oil prices. However, do theories of supply and demand govern when 
the quantity demanded is a function of government policy and the traded 
commodity is incarceration?1 Do private prison corporations, who 
contribute to the supply side of incarceration by virtue of prison capacities, 
 
1 See Kenneth L. Avio, On Private Prisons: An Economic Analysis of the Model 
Contract and Model Statute for Private Incarceration, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 265, 279 (1991). 
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have a perverse incentive to advocate for longer prison sentences and 
stricter parole laws to increase demand for their product?2 
market, a profitable prison corporation must either trim inefficiencies, 
increase inmate numbers or do both . . . .the privatized prison industry has 
incentives to increase incarceration rates, the lengths of sentences, . . . all 
3 Private prison corporations have been 
likened to the hotel 
strong economic incentive to book every available room and encourage 
4 This note will investigate the 
argest private prison 
corporations, both at the federal and state level, to explore whether a 
corollary relationship exists between their activities and sentencing 
policies that increase demand for prison capacity. 
To begin, the note will provide a brief overview of the private prison 
industry and explain the social and political factors that contributed to its 
increased prominence in the criminal justice system. Secondly, the note 
will provide an overview of the three largest private prison operators, 
analyzing their individual political lobbying expenditures and their 
corporate policies governing their political lobbying. Part III will discuss 
the role of the American Legislative Exchange Council in the explosive 
growth of the prison population and will argue that membership in this 
council, more than traditional lobbying and other nefarious methods of 
increasing demand, was the primary contributor for the increased 
utilization of private prisons. In Part IV, the note will explore recent threats 
to the long-term business viability of private prison corporations and will 
argue that increased public scrutiny poses an existential threat to the 
privatization of prisons. The note concludes that despite its legislative 
victories which were the basis for mass incarceration and as a result, 
increased demand for its product, private prison corporations are ill-
justice. 
B. History of private prisons in the United States 
Though thought to be a modern novelty in response to increased 
expenditures on prisons, the commoditization of incarceration began as 
 
2 See id. 
3 See Matthew Mulch, Crime and Punishment in Private Prisons, 66 NAT L LAW GUILD 
REV. 70, 71 (2009). 
4 Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1998, at 
51, 64. 
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early as the 18th century.5 Government officials appointed a head jailer for 
a particular jurisdiction who would frequently sell the labor of his inmates, 
or accept payment for preferential treatment.6 Following the Civil War, 
prison populations in southern states increased dramatically, leading 
prison administrators to outsource inmate labor in a practice known as 
7 The practice became so widespread after the Civil War 
that every Southern state, except for Virginia, adopted inmate leasing 
relationships with private individuals or firms.8 Not surprisingly, an 
overwhelming majority of the inmates in the South were Black, and served 
disproportionately long sentences.9 
It was market forces, rather than the moral abhorrence of inmate 
leasing systems, that led to the diminished popularity of such programs 
towards the end of the 19th century.10 Government officials, realizing the 
tremendous costs of basic inmate provisions and operational costs of 
maintaining prisons, determined that the programs led to diminishing 
returns.11 Furthermore, competing industries and organized labor decried 
the competitive advantage gained by the minimal labor costs available 
through convict leasing.12 At the Federal level, President Theodore 
Roosevelt signed an executive order prohibiting the use of convict labor 
on federal projects in 1905, followed by the Hawes-Cooper Convict Labor 
Act of 1929, allowing states to prohibit the interstate importation of goods 
manufactured by inmates.13 As the practice of convict leasing in state run 
institutions became less prevalent, operational and administrative 
management of correctional institutions became a function of the 
government, save for a few ancillary services which remained privatized.14 
The first resurgence of privatized prisons was in the 1974, when 
Congress passed the Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act aimed at 
preventing juvenile delinquency through alternative programming and 
decrease reliance on traditional forms of incarceration.15 The landmark 
 
5 See James Austin & Garry Coventry, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 19 
(Bureau Just. Assistance, NCJ 181249, 
2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf. 
6 Id. at 9. 
7 See Mulch, supra note 3, at 71 
8 See Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison 
in Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 127 (2001). 
9 See Mulch, supra note 3, at 72. 
10 See id. 
11 See Austin & Coventry, supra note 5, at 11. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
15 See Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 
1109. 
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legislation established federal standards for the treatment of juvenile 
offenders and also provided financial inducements for state compliance.16 
There were two principle goals of the legislation: (1) to end the practice of 
housing juvenile offenders in adult jails and prisons, and (2) to find 
alternative methods of rehabilitating juveniles.17 The financial 
inducements coupled with the demand for innovative approaches to 
incarceration, created an incentive for the private sector to explore ways 
to capitalize the criminal justice sector.18 
As a result, large corporations with no expertise in criminal justice and 
juvenile rehabilitative services, but recognizing the opportunity for 
lucrative government contracts, began operating juvenile correctional 
facilities. Two years after its passage, RCA Services, a division of Radio 
Corporation of America began operating Weaverville Intensive Treatment 
Unit in North Hampton, Pennsylvania, a juvenile center for serious 
offenders.19 Shortly thereafter, the Eckerd Corporation, a drug 
manufacturer and drug store chain, assumed control of the Okeechobee 
School for Boys in Florida.20  In 1984, the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
signed a three-year contract with Eclectic Communications, Inc., to house 
sixty 18 to 26-year-old offenders at Hidden Valley Ranch in California.21 
The Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act sought to improve juvenile 
outcomes by incentivizing innovative approaches to juvenile justice, and 
in doing so, transformed the entire criminal justice system by revealing its 
profitability. 
Contemporaneously, state correctional institutions began contracting 
with private prison corporations. The Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA) was contracted to manage the Hamilton County jail in Tennessee, 
and subsequently in 1985 was contracted to manage the complete 
22 The first privately owned and 
operated facility opened in 1985, when United States Corrections 
Corporation opened Marion Adjustment Center in Kentucky, functioning 
as a minimum-security facility for inmates nearing parole.23 
Shortly after their introduction, the demand for additional private 
prisons increased because of a rapid increase in the prison population 
 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 Patrick Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional 
Facilities: Public versus Private Management, 4 (Economic Growth Center Yale 
University, Working Paper No. 863, 2003), 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cpd863.pdf. 
19 Austin & Coventry, supra note 5, at 12. 
20 Id. 
21 See Mulch, supra note 3, at 73. 
22 See id. 
23 Austin & Coventry, supra note 5, at 12. 
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nationally. The explosive growth in the total number of privatized 
correctional facilities is closely correlated to the aggressive governmental 
policies adopted to combat crime beginning in the late 1980s. There are 
two primary contributors to the size of a prison population: the number of 
offenders that are admitted to prison and the duration of their sentences.24 
Between 1988 and 2012, the number of annual federal prison admissions 
nearly tripled, increasing from 19,232 to 56,952.25 Concurrently, the 
average time served by released federal offenders doubled from 17.9 to 
37.5 months.26 In no other category of crime was this exponential increase 
more visible than in drug offense, in which the population of incarcerated 
drug offenders increased from 15,000 to nearly 100,000 between 1988 and 
2012.27 
Predictably, this increase in both the volume of offenders admitted as 
well as the length of their prison sentences, resulted in the exponential 
growth of the federal prison population, increasing from 49,928 in 1988 to 
217,815 in 2012, a 336 percent increase.28 This upward trend in prison 
population was observed in both state and federal correctional facilities, 
number of federal and state inmates increased approximately 74 percent 
between 1979 and 1986.29 From 1970 to 2007, the aggregate prison 
population increased from 196,000 to 1.5 million, representing an increase 
of nearly 800 percent.30 The tougher sentencing guidelines and increased 
policing was accredited to the growing angst nationally surrounding 
perceived increases in violent crime, as well as the increased militarization 
of the criminal justice system to combat social ills, as evidenced by 
 
The motivation for sentencing reform has historically been attributed 
to the mood of the country on crime and punishment, vacillating between 
judicial autonomy and discretionary sentencing to proscribed sentencing 
 






28 See id. 
29 See Gary Hunter & Peter Wagner, Prisons, Politics, and the Census, in PRISON 
PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION, 80, 81 (Tara Herivel & 
Paul Wright eds., 2007). 
30 See JFA Institute, Unlocking America, Why and How to Reduce America s Prison 
Population 1, 1 (2007), https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Resources/Ref/2007-
11_UnlockingAmerica.pdf.; Mulch, supra note 3, at 73. 
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intended to create parity in punishment.31 The 1980s and 1990s was replete 
requirements and release policies to become more restrictive.32 In the early 
1970s, states typically allowed discretionary release of offenders by parole 
boards, who would review inmate behavior and participation in 
educational and work programs.33 While allowing an individualized 
review of inmate sentences provided a mechanism to control prison 
populations, such discretion drew widespread criticism because of the 
resultant parity in sentencing.34 As discretionary sentences continued to 
draw public criticism, national concerns with the crime rate increase 
translated into states developing sentencing guidelines, enacting 
mandatory minimums sentences and other measures intended to both 
provide uniformity in sentencing, while also increasing the severity of 
those sentences.35 
Not surprisingly, these new sentencing guidelines and limits on 
judicial discretion led to prison crowding in state correctional facilities, 
necessitating an infusion of federal subsidies.36 In response, Congress 
appropriated funding in the form of incentive grants to build or expand 
correctional facilities through the Violent Offender Incarceration and 
Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants Program in the 1994 Crime Act.37 
To qualify for these grants, states were required to adopt truth-in-
sentencing laws which mandated that individuals convicted of a Part 1 
violent crimes were obligated to serve a minimum of 85% of their prison 
sentence.38 The incentive proved incredibly successful, with thirty-two 
states and the District of Columbia adopting laws meeting the Federal 85% 
truth-in-sentencing requirement.39 Ironically, measures taken to assure 
parity in criminal punishment and sentencing substantially increased the 
prison population, creating the framework for the proliferation of private 
prisons. 
 
31 PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP T OF JUST., TRUTH IN 
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 2 (1999). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796. 
38 See id. 
39 See U.S. DEP T OF JUST., supra note 31, at 3. 
100 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:93 
C. Utility of Private Prisons 
The exponential growth in aggregate prison population has resulted in 
substantial increases in government spending on corrections both locally 
and federally, while also resulting in prison overcrowding and unsafe 
conditions. Exacerbating this demand for alternative methods of 
incarceration, are mandates by the federal courts for states to employ 
corrective measures to alleviate the overcrowding in its prisons.40 In 1991, 
federal courts found that overcrowding in prisons in forty states violated 
constitutional standards.41 In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States 
contemplated the issue of prison overcrowding in Brown v. Plata and 
affirmed the di
system reduce its prison capacity to 137.5% of its design capacity within 
two years.42 Judicial mandate to alleviate prison overcrowding, directly 
attributable to tougher sentencing laws, has compelled states to seek 
immediately available alternative solutions to state operated facilities, for 
which contracts with private prisons presented as a viable solution. 
Furthermore, as inmate populations increased, so did the government 
expenditures on incarceration, burdening state and federal budgets. 
Therefore, governmental agencies looked to the private sector to 
incorporate efficiencies and cost-cutting strategies that it employs to 
increase profit margins, as a strategy to decrease overall governmental 
expenditures on incarceration.43 Federal prison spending increased 595 
percent from 1980 to 2013, from $970 million to more than $6.7 billion, 
accounting for inflation.44 In fact, the federal budget for prisons in 2013 
equaled the federal budget of the entire U.S. Justice Department in 1980.45 
Contracting with private prison corporations also allowed government 
agencies to avoid cumbersome procurement and obligation bonds to 
finance the construction of new prison facilities.46 Rather than construct 
and operate the prisons, governments contract with private prison 
operators at a fixed per diem amount (presumably lower than what would 
have been expended in the alternative) to house and provide basic services 
to the inmates. Prison privatization was perceived, and propagated, as a 
 
40 See Douglas C. McDonald, Private Penal Institutions, 16 CRIME & JUST. 361, 393 
(1992). 
41 Kade A. Rhodes, Locked Out of Business: A Look at the Future of the Private Prison 
Industry, 18 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 224, 228 29 (2018). 
42 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 509 10, 546 (2011). 
43 See Lisa Lambert, States Seek to Escape Rising Prison Costs, REUTERS (May 20, 
2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-states-prisons/states-seek-to-escape-rising-
prison-costs-idUSTRE74J3S920110520. 
44 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 24. 
45 Id. 
46 See McDonald, supra note 40, at 393-94. 
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mutually beneficial solution to the financial strain of mass incarceration; 
governments were no longer burdened with the cumbersome management 
of correctional institutions, and private prisons could eliminate the 
bureaucratic inefficiencies to create a profitable enterprise. 
D. Private Prison Viability Inextricably Bound to Political Climate 
Because the private prison business model is largely predicated on 
procuring government contracts to build and manage correctional 
facilities, their financial viability is inextricably bound to the political and 
legislative sentiment towards criminal justice broadly and privatization 
more specifically. Private prison corporations are acutely aware of the 
financial risk that policies to reducing the prison population pose to their 
profitability and advise their investors accordingly.47 Correctional 
Corporation of America, in its 2010 Annual Report to the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) cautioned investors: 
Our ability to secure new contracts to develop and manage 
correctional and detention facilities depends on my 
factors outside our control. Our growth is generally 
dependent upon our ability to obtain new contracts to 
develop and manage new correctional and detention 
facilities. This possible growth depends on a number of 
factors we cannot control, including crime rats and 
sentencing patterns in various jurisdictions and 
acceptance of privatization. The demand for our facilities 
and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation 
of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or parole 
standards and sentencing practices or through the 
decriminalization of certain activities that are currently 
proscribed by our criminal laws. For instance, any 
changes with respect to drugs and controlled substances 
or illegal immigration could affect the number of persons 
arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially 
reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them. 
Legislation has been proposed in numerous jurisdictions 
that could lower minimum sentences for some non-
violent crimes and make more inmates eligible for early 
release based on good behavior. Also, sentencing 
alternatives under consideration could put some offenders 
on probation with electronic monitoring who would 
 
47 See JUST. POL Y INST., GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF 
PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES 29 (2011). 
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otherwise be incarcerated. Similarly, reductions in crime 
rates or resources dedicated to prevent and enforce crime 
could lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and 
sentences requiring incarceration in correctional 
facilities.48 
 
outside of its control, such as the decriminalization of substance abuse or 
changes to illegal immigration policies, is illustrative of the dependence 
of private prison corporations on favorable criminal justice policies and 
lends credence to theories of political maneuvering to ensure those 
policies. The GEO Group articulated a similar vulnerability to variance in 
public or legislative sentiment towards government utilization of public-
private partnerships for correctional facilities in its 2019 second-quarter 
SEC filing: 
Any report prepared by or requested by a governmental agency or 
public official, investigation or inquiry, public statement by any 
governmental agency or public official, policy or legislative change, or 
other similar occurrence or action, that seeks to, or purports to, prohibit, 
eliminate, or otherwise restrict or limit in any way, the federal 
private operators of these facilities and centers, could adversely impact our 
ability to maintain or renew existing contracts or to obtain new contracts.49 
Private prison operators recognize that their business models are 
susceptible not only to fluctuations in the prison populations but are 
inherently aware that their businesses are intimately bound to the 
government policies that govern incarceration and utilization of public-
private partnerships. Because the long-term viability of private prisons is 
dependent on strong, positive relationships with government officials, 
significant investments in political lobbying and governmental relations is 
justifiably considered a necessary business expenditure. 
Investors are similarly cognizant of the considerable influence that 
public policy and governmental agencies have on the fiscal viability of 
private prison operators. This was evidenced by the market response to the 
August 2016 announcement by the U.S. Department of Justice that it 
would stop contracting with private prisons to operate federal prisons. 
After the announcement, the C
 
48 Corr. Corp. of Am., 2010 Annual Report (Form 10-K), 19-20 (Dec. 31, 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
49 GEO Group Inc., 2019 Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 12, 2020). 
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price decreased by fifty percent.50 In response, the company adopted a 
more expansive name, CoreCivic, to demonstrate that its focus was not 
limited to criminal corrections, rather the business provided a wider array 
of public-private solutions.51 
which its stock price rose by 40 percent.52 Similarly, GEO experienced a 
30 percent increase in stock valuation after the 2016 presidential 
election.53 
Recognizing the immediate threat that this policy posed to their 
business, GEO Group contributed a total of $200,000 to support the 
election of Donald Trump, with the largest contribution recorded on the 
day after t
of private prisons.54 In 2017,  the stock prices for both CoreCivic and GEO 
Group more than doubled after U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
announced that it would continue contracting with private prisons.55 
Because government action and legislative policy are highly determinative 
of their financial viability and long-term sustainability, it stands to reason 
that these companies would benefit from maintaining relationships and 
advocating for policies that would promote their business interests. David 
Shicor, a prominent author in opposition of prison privatization opined, 
provision of perks to politicians (as industrial and business corporations 
do), corporations are likely to continue to support and even accelerate 
incarceration-oriented legislation and policies by which more people will 
56 The drastic 
change in stock valuation in response to the Obama Department of Justice 
announcement as compared to after the election of Donald Trump is 
illustrative of the inextricable nature of private prisons and government 
policy, thus incentivizing fir
candidates. 
 
50 Matt Stroud, Private Prisons Get a Boost from Trump, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Nov. 18, 2016); see KARA GOTSCH & VINAY BASTI, THE SENT G PROJECT, CAPITALIZING 
ON MASS INCARCERATION: U.S. GROWTH IN PRIVATE PRISONS 12 (2018). 
51 See Gotsch & Basti, supra note 50, at 12. 
52 See Stroud, supra note 50. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See Gotsch & Basti, supra note 50, at 12. 
56 DAVID SCHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 236 
(1995). 
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PART II: PRIVATE PRISON CORPORATION PROFILES: POLITICAL 
LOBBYING AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
The rate of growth of inmates housed in private prisons far exceeds 
the overall rate of growth in national incarceration rates.57 Between 1990 
and 2009, the number of people incarcerated in for-profit prisons grew 
more than 1,600%, increasing from approximately 7,000 to 129,000 
inmates.58 Private prisons operating in the United States housed 121,718 
people in 2017, representing 8.2% of the aggregate state and federal prison 
population.59 The Federal Bureau of Prisons maintains the highest prison 
population managed by private prison contractors, in 2017 the aggregate 
population in federal custody managed by private contractors including 
those in prisons, half-way houses and home confinement totaled 
27,569.60 There is significant variance in state utilization of private 
correctional facilities.61 For instance, while New Mexico Department of 
Corrections reports that 53% of its prison population is in private facilities, 
whereas there are twenty-two states who do not contract with private 
prisons. 62 The three largest and most prominent private prison operators 
are, CoreCivic (formerly Corrections Corporation of America), GEO 
Group, and Management and Training Corporation.63 
A. CoreCivic 
One of the most established private prison corporations is CoreCivic, 
who previously operated as Corrections Corporation of America. The 
company website suggests that the principle motivation for its formation 
was the federal judicial mandate that states prison overcrowding and 
similar practices were unconstitutional.64  CoreCivic, a publicly-traded 
real estate investment trust (REIT) on the New York Stock Exchange, is 
owner of partnership correctional, detention, and 
65 In 2018, the company posted an annual 
 
57 See AM. C.L. UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS 
INCARCERATION 5 (2011). 
58 Id. 




63 See id. 
64 Tom Beasley, A New Industry Emerges to Meet a Very Real Need, CORECIVIC, 
http://www.corecivic.com/about/history (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
65 About CoreCivic, CORECIVIC, https://www.corecivic.com/about (last visited Feb. 20, 
2020). 
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revenue of $1.8 billion, netting $520 million gross profit.66 Over half of 
ctional 
contracts.67 In addition to the operational management of its correctional 
facilities, CoreCivic invests in political and government relations to 
68 
CoreCivic maintains a clearly articulated and robust policy governing 
its political contributions and lobbying activities, and asserts that 
transparency is critical to its relationship with government partners, 
taxpayers and shareholders.69 Direct governance of the c
political and government relations activities and compliance is provided 
by the Risk Committee of the Board of Directors.70 The company sponsors 
a political action committee, bearing its name, that makes contributions to 
federal candidates and candidates in jurisdictions which corporate 
contributions are not permitted.71 In 2018 CoreCivic, through its corporate 
and political action committee, contributed  $1,186,390.46 in political 
contributions to candidates, political parties, and committees.72 Since 
1995, CoreCivic has contributed $5,749,467.00 to 1,533 state-level 
candidates nationwide.73 Interestingly, while there was a slight advantage 
in contributions made to Republican candidates (62%) as compared to 
Democratic candidates (33%), contributions tended to be directed to 
incumbents (79%) and ultimately the winning candidate (86 percent).74 In 
2018, CoreCivic expended $1.43 million in payments and fees to support 
direct lobbying at the Federal, state and local levels, of which $617,797 
was attributable to Federal direct lobbying. 75 
 
66 CoreCivic, Inc. (CXW US Equity), BLOOMBERG LAW, 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/company/financials/CXW%20US%20Equity/Overview 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
67 CORECIVIC INC, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (Jul. 19, 2019), 
https://investigate.afsc.org/company/corecivic#:~:text=In%202018%2C%20CoreCivic%
20reported%20%241.83,Bureau%20of%20Prisons%20(BOP). 
68 Political & Lobbying Activity, CORECIVIC, http://ir.corecivic.com/corporate-
governance/political-lobbying-activity (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
69 See generally Political Activity and Lobbying Report 2018, CORECIVIC, 1, 
http://ir.corecivic.com/static-files/e621a712-a923-43b7-8533-0fef1c04cab0 (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2019). 
70 Id. at 2. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 3. 
73 CoreCivic FKA Corrections Corp of America / CCA, NAT L INST. ON MONEY IN POL.: 
FOLLOWTHEMONEY, https://www.followthemoney.org/entity-details?eid=695 (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2020). 
74 Id. 
75 CORECIVIC, supra note 69, at 7. 
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Although the company maintains robust government relations 
activities, the company has a longstanding policy which prohibits lobbying 
durat 76 Rather, the 
company asserts that its government relations activities are principally 
the construction, operation and leasing of privately owned or managed 
77 Despite 
historical giving patterns do not exhibit the trends one would expect, 
namely, giving to a particular party or committee members responsible for 
crafting legislation dealing 
political strategy seems to favor incumbent candidates and those with the 
greatest probability of victory. 
Surprisingly, the company has committed sizeable government 
relations resources and expertise to advocate for policies that would  
appear to be antithetical to their business-model, in particular policies to 
-the-
and liabilities for companies looking to hire former inmates; increased 
funding for reentry programming; and, social impact bond pilot programs 
which tie contractor performance measures and payment to positive 
outcomes for participants.78 On first-glance, these recidivism-reducing 
policies would appear to be adverse to its business interests, which is 
predicated on higher volume and duration of incarceration, however 
CoreCivic maintains that successful reentry, and thus reduced recidivism, 
to be fundamental to its mission as a corporation.79 
B. The GEO Group, Inc. 
The second largest private prison corporation is The GEO Group Inc. 
operates in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, is publicly 
traded real estate investment trust on the New York Stock Exchange.80 In 
its corporate mission statement, GEO states that it seeks to develop 
-private partnerships with government agencies around 
 
76 Id. at 2. 
77 Id. 
78 See generally Reentry Policies, CORECIVIC, 
http://www.corecivic.com/reentrypolicies (last visited Nov. 8, 2019). 
79 Id. 
80 The GEO Group Inc. (GEO U.S. Equity), BLOOMBERG LAW, 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/company/ticker/GEO%20US%20Equity (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2019). 
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the globe that deliver high quality, correctional, community reentry, and 
electronic monitoring services . . 81 GEO employs 22,000 globally and 
reported an annual revenue of $2.3 billion dollars in 2018 derived from its 
fully diversified array of correctional services.82 As a company whose 
business is predicated on public-private partnerships, GEO cultivates 
relationships with government agencies in the United States and 
globally.83 
monitored by its legal department and Board of Directors, to ensure that 
all activity is in accord with state and federal law.84 GEO also sponsors a 
non-partisan political action committee, funded exclusively by voluntary 
employee contributions and makes contributions to federal candidates and 
state candidates in those in jurisdictions in which they are permitted.85 In 
2018, between its corporate donations and its political action committee, 
GEO donated $3,324,690 to individual candidates, parties and 
committees, at the federal, state and local levels. Aggregating the political 
contributions of GEO Group, which includes Cornell Companies and 
Correctional Services Corp. which were acquired by GEO, the company 
has contributed $11,351,381.00 to 1,128 candidates seeking state office.86 
As was with CoreCivic, GEO prioritizes campaign contributions to 
incumbents (76 percent) and eventual winners (76 percent), as compared 
to exhibiting a party allegiance; giving to Republican candidates sixty-
seven percent of the time and Democratic candidates twenty-four percent 
of the time.87 Additionally, GEO expended an aggregate amount of $4.3 
million to consultant government relations professionals involved in direct 
lobbying at the federal, state and local levels.88 Notably, one of the lobbyist 
employed by the GEO Group in 2019 is Pam Biondi, who served as the 
Florida Attorney General from 2011 to 2019.89 
 
81 See Who We Are, GEO GROUP, https://www.geogroup.com/who_we_are (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2021). 
82 See generally The GEO Group, Inc. Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 31, 2019). 
83 Political Activity and Lobbying Report 2018, THE GEO GROUP, 1, 
https://www.geogroup.com/Portals/0/SR/Political%20Engagement/Political_Activity_an






89 See Client Profile: GEO Group, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-
lobbying/clients/lobbyists?cycle=2019&id=D000022003 (last Visited Jan. 16, 2020); 
see also Former Florida Attorney General Pam Biondi Joins Ballard Partners, FLORIDA 
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GEO asserts that its engagement in legislative and regulatory 
proceedings is imperative to promoting the benefits of public-private 
partnerships and are focused on government actions that directly impact 
public-private partnerships in its service areas.90 The company insists that 
its political contributions and lobby expenditures do not seek to influence 
criminal justice or immigration policies, nor does GEO lobby for or 
91 
political contributions reveals that its giving patterns are far more 
indiscriminate than what was evidenced by the sizeable contribution to the 
Trump administration immediately following the Department of Justice 
decision to no longer contract with private prisons to operate federal 
political activity, and policies and legislation that would increase the 
volume or duration of imprisonment. 
C. Management & Training Corporation 
Of the three largest private prison contractors, Management & 
92 
Maintaining sixty-two contracts in twenty-one states and internationally, 
MTC employs 8,446 people globally.93 Because MTC privatized in 2016, 
the last available financial statement indicates that its total revenue in 2015 
was $753 million, yielding a net profit of $30 million.94 MTC employs a 
political action committee, the majority of whose donors are senior 
executives of MTC or their spouses.95 In 2018, its political action 
committee contributed $111,950 to federal candidates; sixty-seven percent 
of which were to Republican candidates.96 
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92 DANNY JASPERSON AND KARIN RUEFF, AMERICA S MASS INCARCERATION PROBLEM: 
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94 Management & Training Corp (41311365Z US Equity), BLOOMBERG LAW, 
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iew (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
95 See Management & Training Corp., OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
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D. Day 1 Alliance 
To combat the growing criticism of prison privatization, the three 
aforementioned companies formed a trade group called the Day 1 
Alliance, which is designed to redefine the public perception of the 
industry.97 The description of the alliance indicates that its name affirms 
the responsibility of private prison contractors to provide humane and 
respectful treatment of incarcerated and detained individuals for the 
entirety of the moment they enter into their care.98 Among the issues that 
the Day 1 Alliance champions are policies aimed at reducing recidivism, 
including the passage of the First Step Act.99 
PART III: ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Despite the sizeable investments made to support traditional political 
lobbying and campaign contributions, the greatest dividends for private 
prison corporations appear to derive from their membership and 
participation in a relatively unknown public policy non-profit 
organization, the American Legislative Exchange Council.100 ALEC is a 
voluntary, nonpartisan membership organization of state legislators 
committed to espousing the principles of limited government, free markets 
and federalism.101 Nearly one-
stakeholders are members of ALEC, collectively representing more than 
60 million Americans.102 These elected officials work collaboratively with 
-membership base, corporations and private sector 
interest groups, to propose policy recommendations in a multitude of 
areas.103 Private sector representatives work with legislative members to 
draft model legislation, bills that serve as templates for actual legislation 
 
97 Daniel Lippman, Meet the K Street types giving to the Democratic candidates, 
POLITICO INFLUENCE (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-
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99 Issues, DAY ONE ALLIANCE, https://day1alliance.org/issues/ (last visited Apr. 27, 
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100 See JUST. POL Y INST., supra note 47, at 29. 
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https://www.alec.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020). 
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103 Allison Boldt, Rhetoric v. Reality: ALEC s Disguise as a Nonprofit Despite Its 
Extensive Lobbying, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL Y 35, 36 (2012). 
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104 On average, ALEC 
drafts approximately 1,000 pieces model acts every year, which are 
embers; approximately 20 percent of 
which are enacted as law.105 Thousands of ALEC model acts have been 
adopted by state legislatures and enacted nationwide, and have been the 
basis for a number of highly controversial laws. One such law that has 
been the source of widespread public animus is the Stand Your Ground 
law, which gained national notoriety because of its association with the 
senseless murder of Trayvon Martin.106 
Forces, comprised of both private sector and legislative members.107 Task 
jurisdiction.108 To be adopted, an ALEC model act must be approved by 
its Governing Board and have majority support from legislative Task 
Force members, as well as its private sector members, who are polled 
separately.109 This collaborative drafting process, coupled with the 
required consensus between its legislative and private sector members, 
provides private sector members unfettered access to draft legislation that 
promotes their business interests.110 
Until their departure in 2010, two notable private sector members and 
supporting contributors of ALEC were Corrections Corporation of 
America and GEO, paying between $7,000 and $25,000 in annual 
membership.111 CCA maintained a seat, and at times co-chaired, the Public 
Safety Task Force (formerly the Criminal Justice and Homeland Security 
Task Force), which developed model legislation with respect to criminal 
justice and national security.112 Over the span of two decades, CCA was 
actively involved in the development of more than 85 model bills and 
resolutions that mandated tougher criminal sentencing, increased 
immigration enforcement and facilitated the privatization of prisons.113 In 
the mid-
served as the private sector chair of the task force that drafted and adopted 
model legislation that would increase both the volume and duration of 
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incarceration.114 Contemporaneously, ALEC drafted model bills which 
established mandatory minimums, three strikes laws (mandating 25 years 
-in-
inmates to serve a majority of their sentence without the possibility of 
parole), which served as the foundation for the exponential growth in 
incarceration. 115 In its 1995 Model Legislation Scorecard, the ALEC 
cing Act and 
by the Task Force. At least one of these model bills has been enacted in 
116 In an article entitled Getting Tough 
Works: Old Strategies Are the Weapons in the New War on Crime, a 
-in-sentencing, based on 
ALEC model bill, require inmates to serve 80 to 90 percent of their 
117 Membership in ALEC 
allowed private prison corporations to circumvent the traditional 
legislative process by working collaboratively to author favorable model 
legislation without the burden of cumbersome public disclosure laws that 
govern the legislative process. 
Not only did ALEC model legislation serve as the catalyst for the 
contract with private prison operators.118 The model act allo
unit of government to contract with the private sector  to perform services 
119 In fact, in one session 
Criminal Justice Task Force.120 Membership in ALEC not only afforded 
private prison corporations the opportunity to draft legislation that led to 
the explosive growth in the domestic prison population, but the very laws 
that allowed for their existence are attributable to their membership in this 
organization.121 
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B. Single Issue Lobbies 
While the lobbying efforts of private prison corporations have elicited 
the greatest public angst because of the perceived moral abhorrence for 
private entities profiting from mass incarcerations, some theorists posit 
that single issue lobbies, like the public-sector corrections unions, are 
more responsible for the enactment of tough-on-crime legislation.122 For 
instance, the California Correctional Peace Officers Association 
 and most active public sector single issue 
lobbies, has made significant financial contributions to tough-on-crime 
123 The CCPOA was actively 
-
strikes law.124 Shortly thereafter, the association began advocating for the 
passage of a 10-20-life set of mandatory minimum penalties for crimes 
committed with firearms.125 Theorists opine that because single-issue 
lobbies are cause-driven and are dependent on a cause for their existence, 
achievement of one objective leads cause organizers to quickly identify 
immediate support of strict sentencing for gun laws, shortly after 
successful passage of the three-strikes laws. Similar to private prison 
corporations single issue advocacy groups, like the public-sector 
correctional unions, derive a pecuniary benefit from mass incarceration, 
except their dividends are in the form of more correctional jobs and thus 
increased union membership, as compared to distributed profits.126 
C. Nefarious Business Development Strategies 
In addition to political advocacy, there are concerns that private prison 
operators  employee nefarious business development strategies to fill 
vacancies in their facilities.127 An example of such troubling behavior 
gained national attention in February 2011, when a federal jury convicted 
Pennsylvania Judge Mark Ciavarella of racketeering, money laundering, 
and conspiracy in what prosecuto 128 
Ciavarella was convicted of accepting nearly one million dollars from 
developers of a private juvenile facility in Pennsylvania in exchange for 
giving excessive sentences juveniles to excessive sentences in the private 
 
122 Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (2008). 
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facilities.129 
22% of juvenile detentions in Pennsylvania, despite Luzerne County 
130 In one incident, 
Judge Ciavarella purportedly based a ju
131 The 
unscrupulous business dealings casted such uncertainty about the merit of 
have any confidence that Ciavarella decided any Luzerne County juvenile 
case fairly and impartially while he labored under the specter of his self-
132 
particularly egregious and likely not widespread, nevertheless there is 
concern that the occupancy-driven business model of private prisons 
engenders perverse incentive to engage in nefarious activities in order to 
fill vacancies. 
PART IV: THREATS TO PRIVATE PRISON BUSINESS VIABILITY 
Despite the legislative victories which served as the foundation for 
mass incarceration and established the basis for the proliferation of private 
prisons, as well as the restored confidence following  the election of 
Donald Trump, these corporations are experiencing an existential threat 
from an unexpected source, public opinion.133 Ironically, the catalyst for 
the widespread scrutiny and public outcry against private prisons was the 
separation immigration policy.134 De
embrace of prison privatization, constituents are not only using their 
democratic influence to pressure local elected officials to take action 
against private prisons, they have leveraged their influence as consumers 
to pressure banks and other financial institutions to reevaluate their 
business dealings with the industry.135 
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A. State Bans of Private Prisons 
Public frustration with the privatization of prisons, coupled with the 
growing percentage of state expenditures on incarceration have caused 
state legislatures to reevaluate the utility of private prisons.136 There are a 
total of 22 states, governed by both Republican and Democratic 
administrations, that do not contract with for-profit companies to operate 
correctional facilities.137 Additionally, there have been a number of state 
legislatures that have passed legislation banning the use of private prisons 
in their states.138 Nevada passed such a law, prohibiting the use of private 
prions to operate state and local correctional facilities after June 30, 2022, 
and placed more stringent compliance standards for private prison 
operators.139 A month after the passage of the Nevada bill, Illinois, which 
banned for-profit prisons in 1990, expanded that law to include privately 
operated immigration detention centers.140 
Subsequently, California passed a bill in October 2019 that would 
seemingly end the use of for-profit prisons and detention centers in the 
state.141 The legislation establishes that over four years, the state will close 
three private prisons that house 1,400 inmates and will stop operating four 
private detention facilities holding 4,000 individuals in 2020.142 There are, 
however, concerns that the porous bill language which provides an 
ued use of private 
prisons.143 There is also a provision in the law that would not prohibit the 
department of corrections from renewing or extending a contract to house 
inmates to comply with a court-ordered population cap.144 Despite the 
perceived loopholes, private prison corporations view this legislation as an 
assault on their viability and have filed a lawsuit in federal court to 
challenge the ban.145 
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The lawsuit, filed by GEO Group ten days after federal officials signed 
contracts with GEO and two other 
private immigrant detention center for an estimated $6.5 billion dollars, 
asserts that the California legislation is an attempt to subvert the authority 
of the federal government and is thus unconstitutional.146 GEO alleges that 
the legislation violates the Supremacy Clause by imposing a state policy 
which interferes with enactment of Federal immigration law.147 These new 
contracts would double the number of immigrant detention beds in 
California to 7,200.148 Furthermore, GEO manages two federal prisons in 
the state with a combined capacity of 1,237 beds for federal inmates.149 
GEO asserts that if the legislation results in the closing of its facilities in 
California it would lose an average of $250 million dollars in revenue per 
year for fifteen years, as well as an additional $300 million invested in 
acquiring and retrofitting the buildings.150 
A month after GEO filed suit, the Trump administration filed a similar 
lawsuit in federal court seeking injunctive relief of Califo
Bill 32.151 The complaint also asserts that legislation violates the 
Supremacy Clause by dictating how federal inmates and immigration 
detainees can be housed.152 In the complaint, the Trump administration 
asserts that there are about 3,200 federal inmates in California in private 
detention facilities between the U.S. Marshals Service and the Bureau of 
Prisons, in addition to nearly 5,000 Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement detainees in private facilities.153 The complaint alleges that 
compliance with AB 32, which would require transporting inmates and 
detainees out of state, would adversely impact the U.S. Marshals operation 
154 Nevertheless, the 
complaint acknowledges that California is free to regulate its state prisons 
and jails as it sees fit, and thus only challenges the applicability of the 
legislation to federal action.155 
Despite the expansive loopholes included in the bill language, as well 
as the pending legislation challenging its constitutionality, the California 
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the threat posed to the economic viability of private prison corporations 
by local elected officials responding to pressure from their constituents.156 
This vulnerability was articulated by an investment analyst who opined 
to effectively regulate the sector, --or, as many would argue, to eliminate 
private prisons entirely, given their problematic incentive to encourage the 
157 Although state legislative 
action prohibiting the privatization of incarceration presents an existential 
threat through demand-side pressures, public animus has threatened 
operational management. 
B. Divestment by Pension Plans 
Citing records of human rights violations, as well as the volatility of 
private prison corporations subject to political influence, several pensions 
have chosen to divest from private prison corporations.158  Trustees for 
retirement fund in the U.S. to divest assets, approximately $48 million in 
stock and bonds from GEO Group Inc., CoreCivic Inc. and G4s Plc.159 The 
decision to divest was also motivated by lawsuits and reports of abuse, 
wrongful deaths, and increased violence resulting from insufficient 
staffing in private facilities, which the pension managers cited as  a long-
term financial threat to investors.160 In an editorial published in the New 
York Times and written by New York City Comptroller, Scott Stringer, he 
encourages other pension funds to divest from private prison corporations 
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investments . . . .That means constantly evaluating the long-term viability 
 . . . Private 
161 The cited motivation to divest, not 
because of the moral abhorrence of profiting from mass incarceration and 
immigrant detention, rather a fiduciary obligation to its investors, signals 
that investors perceive a business model that is predicated on fractious 
government contracts are too uncertain to maintain investments. 
Retirement System, the New York State Common Retirement System and 
Pension Fund and the Califo
divested their direct stock holdings of private prison corporations.162 In 
August 2018, the New Jersey Pension Fund divested $1.3 million in stock 
investment merits, including consideration of environmental, social and 
governance issues, and consistent with its fiduciary responsibility elected 
163 Pension fund managers, recognizing a fiduciary 
responsibility to their investors, have concluded that the political volatility 
of prison privatization coupled with litigation alleging inhumane treatment 
of inmates, have rendered investments in private prison operators 
imprudent.164 Divestment by pension funds pose a grave threat to the long-
term financial viability of publicly-traded prison corporations, who are 
dependent on stock offerings as a method of accessing capital to maintain 
its business operations. 
C. Commercial Bank Financing 
While the decision by pension funds to divest their stock holdings in 
private prison corporations will likely lead to decreases in stock valuation, 
perhaps the gravest threat to private prisons is the recent decision by 
commercial lenders to terminate their relationship with private prison 
corporations.165 The majority of publicly recognized commercial lenders 
have committed to not renewing an estimated $2.4 billion in credit lines 
and term loans to GEO Group and CoreCivic once their current facilities 
expire.166 In its decision to end its business relationships with private 
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prisons, Bank of America cited both legal and policy concerns, as well as 
employee and stakeholder apprehensions regarding its financing of private 
prison operators.167 Similarly, PNC Bank announced that it would cease 
business relationships with private prison operators in response to a 
petition circulated from the Families Belong Together coalition of over 
250 groups, representing over 11 million individuals.168 The decision to no 
longer provide financing is acutely detrimental to private prison 
corporations, who rely on the capital to sustain their operational 
management.169 
GEO Group and CoreCivic operate as Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs), meaning that most of their assets and income are derived from 
real estate investments.170 In exchange for favorable tax benefits, REITs 
are required to distribute at least 90 percent of taxable income as dividends 
to shareholders.171 The one year returns to shareholders for both GEO 
Group and CoreCivic are down nearly 30%, resulting in their designation 
as underperforming relative to other REITs.172 This mandated payout of 
dividends leaves the companies with little cash on hand to cover day-to-
day operations, such as salaries and other administrative costs and 
therefore are reliant on revolving credit from commercial banks to run 
their operations.173 Although the REIT business model yields favorable tax 
benefits and results in higher shareholder dividends, without access to 
capital from financial institutions the long-term business viability of 
private prisons is uncertain save for adoption of an alternative business 
model which maintains a higher percentage of capital gains. 
GEO Group articulated the threat posed to its long-term viability if 
additional financial institutions cease financing in its most recent SEC 
filing: 
[S]everal financial institutions, including some of our 
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renewing existing agreements or entering into new 
agreements with companies that operate such facilities 
and centers pursuant to public-private partnerships. Some 
of these same institutions have ceased their equity analyst 
coverage of our company. While we believe we will 
continue to have access to the capital and debt markets 
on a cost-effective basis to support the growth and 
expansion of our high-quality services, if other financial 
institutions or third parties that currently provide us with 
financing or that we do business with decide in the future 
to cease providing us with financing or doing business 
with us, such determinations could have a material 
adverse effect on our business, financial condition and 
results of operations. Increased resistance to the use of 
public-private partnerships for our facilities and centers in 
any of the markets in which we operate, as a result of these 
or other factors, could have a material adverse effect on 
our nosiness, financial condition, results of operations and 
the market price of our securities.174 
Despite its articulated confidence that it will maintain access to capital 
and debt markets, the prospect of securing additional financing remains 
uncertain. In total, the commitments by commercial banks to no longer 
provide financing to private prison operators represents 87.4% of all 
financing available to both CoreCivic and GEO Group.175 The uncertainty 
regarding the ability of private prison corporations to secure financing, 
vital to its business operations, has resulted in Fitch Ratings downgrading 
176 
In June 2019, the New York State Senate passed Bill S5433, which 
prohibits banks chartered in the state from financing private prisons.177 In 
a speech introducing the legislation, bill sponsor Senator Benjamin said, 
their hard-earned savings in a bank . . .  expecting that those funds will be 
used to finance mass i 178 Senator Benjamin recognizes that 
a concerted effort to limit access to capital, coupled with community 
 
174 GEO Group Inc., 2019 2nd Quarter Report on Form 10-K 58 (June 2019) (emphasis 
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pressure to end privatization, are important strategies to combat the use of 
private prisons.179 
Some speculate that if traditional lenders are no longer available, non-
bank lenders, such as private equity investors or hedge fund investors, will 
provide the financing needed to operate.180 While this infusion of capital 
will be essential to sustain its business operations under the REIT business 
model, these funding sources are likely to charge higher interest rates 
because of the elevated risk of the loans and diminish profitability.181 
Because private prison corporations rely on financing from shareholders 
and commercial lenders to sustain their business operations, the decision 
by pension funds and private banks to terminate business relationships 
pose the most immediate, and gravest, threat to the vitality of private 
prisons.182 
PART V: CONCLUSION 
Like hotels, private prisons are predicated on a business model that 
requires maximum occupancy to assure profitability. However, unlike 
hotels, whose occupancy is subject to a myriad of externalities, private 
prison occupancy is a function of the domestic prison population and 
government sentiment towards public-private partnerships for 
incarceration. 
Because their business viability is predicated on high rates of 
incarceration and favorable relationships with state and federal 
government representatives, one would presume that private prison 
corporations would have a perverse incentivize to advocate for the 
enactment of laws that increase the number of inmates and the duration of 
their sentences. While private prison operators do maintain robust political 
advocacy and lobbying efforts; their success, beginning in the 1980s, 
appears to be less attributable to their traditional lobbying efforts and more 
likely the result of another form of advocacy, the collaborative drafting of 
policy. 
d 
frameworks responsible for the explosive in the prison population between 
the 1980s and 1990s, were drafted collaboratively as model legislation in 
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). It was membership 
in ALEC that afforded the Correctional Corporations of America (CCA) 
and GEO Group, Inc. the opportunity to work collaboratively with state 
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legislatures nationwide to develop model legislation that would serve as 
the basis for truth-in-sentencing and three strikes laws and resulted in the 
explosive growth of prison populations. Both CoreCivic and GEO Group 
are correct when they assert that they do not actively lobby for legislation 
that increases the amount and duration of incarceration, because rather 
than lobby for the legislation, membership in ALEC allows for a far more 
effective method, they draft it. 
While private prison operators have enjoyed unprecedented growth 
and proven to be incredibly profitable, recent events, beginning with the 
vate prisons for 
federal inmates, have demonstrated their vulnerability to political and 
public sentiment. Widespread consternation with the privatization of 
prisons has resulted in increased democratic and consumer pressure to 
sever relationships with private prison corporations. Recent state 
legislative action prohibiting the contracts to private entities for state 
correctional facilities reveals the demand-side susceptibility of private 
prisons, nevertheless actions by the Trump administration reveal that 
demand is malleable and can be supplemented, as evidenced by the 
extension of service offerings to include immigration detention. Far more 
menacing to the long-term financial viability of private prisons are the 
decisions by pension funds and commercial lenders to terminate business 
relationships with private prisons corporations. These decisions by 
financial institutions demonstrate that they are more responsive to public 
dismay than potential profitability. Therefore, if private prison enterprises 
want to remain financially viable, they would be better served 
concentrating their efforts on improving public sentiment and redefining 
the narrative around privatization of prisons, rather than relying solely on 
favorable government action to drive demand for their product. 
 
